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UNDUE ECONOMIC INFLUENCE ON
PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
FredR. Garzino*

INTRODUCTION
Litigation leading up to the June 1997 United States Supreme Court
decisions of Washington v. Glucksberg, ("Compassion in Dying") 1 and
Quill v. Vacco has generated significant debate concerning their attendant
moral, ethical, and medical ramifications. 3 Discussion in the legal
"Editor-in-chief, DePaul University Law Review. B.A., Drake University, 1972; MA.,
University ofNarth Carolina, Chapel H-ill, 1975; MAL Kellogg Graduate School of Management,
Northwestern University, 1980; J.D. (Cand.) DePaul University, 1998.
'850 F. Supp. 1454 (WD. Wash. 1994), rev'd,49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), qff'd on reh'g,
79 F.3d 790 (enbanc), cert. grantedsub rm., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct 37 (1996).
For clarity of exposition, this case will be generically referred to under its original name as
Compassionin Dying. The individual cases that lead up to the eventual Glucksberg appeal will
be discussed separately.
'Quill v. Kappell, 870 F. Supp. 78(S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd sub norn. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d
716 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S.Ct. 36 (1996).
'The moral and ethical aspects of the physician-assisted suicide question continue to be
extensively debated by bioethicists, theologians, legal scholars, and a host of other advccates on
both sides of the equatiom. The flavor and key considerations of these varied points of view may
be accessed in the following sources.
Sources favoring physician-assisted suicide: Timnothy E. Quill, M.D., Risf. Ta.king By
PhysiciansIn Legally GrayAreas, 57 ALB. L REv. 693 (1994); C.K. Cassel and D.E. Meier,
Morals andMoralism in the Debate Over EutlunasiaandAssistcd Suicide, 323 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 750 (1990); Michael Lasalandra, New EnglandMedical JournalChicfBac&sPhysicianAssisted SuicideBill, BOSTON HERALD, Nov. 5, 1996, at 18; Maura Lemer, "EndofLife" Care;
MedicalSpecialistsDebateHow to Give DeathIts Due and the Dying Their Dignity, STAR 'TRB.,
Oct. 31, 1996, at 12A, Jom A. MacDonald, ProfoundIssues Before Court:Death, Dying - And
Doctors,HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 12, 1996 at Al.
Sources disapproving physician-assisted suicide: Albert R. Jonsen, Physician-Assistad
Suicide, 18 SEATrLEU.L REV. 459 (1995); Stanford H. Kadish, Letting PatientsDie:Legal and
MoralReflections, 80 CAL L REV. 857 (1992); Peter M. Mcgough, M.D., Medical Concerns
About Physician-AssistedSuicide, 18 SEATREU.L REV. 521 (1995); C.S. Campbell, "Aid-InDying" and the Taking of Human Life, 18 L MED. ETaICS 128 (1992); R.M. Sade, Ethical
ArgnentsAgainstPhysician-AssistedDeath,92 J.S.C. MED. ASSOC. 63-69 (1996); CA Tauer,
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community has largely focused on the constitutional aspects of personal

autonomy, the proper reach of states' interests, and infoirned consent.4
Much of the public debate and judicial discussions have centered on the

separate role of each of these factors.5
As this Article will argue, however, conspicuous by its absence has
been any integrated discussion of the role of the economic forces that
underlie these issues and significantly affect legal judgments concerning the
proper balance among them. This omission takes on increased importance

as pivotal structural changes sweep through the United States' health-care

EthicalIssues of Human Embryos Research andPhysician-AssistedSuicide, 274 (17) JAMA
1344 (1995); Physician-AssistedDeath, 152 (2) CAN. MED. Assoc. J. 248A-48B (1995); Arthur
Caplan, BalancingRight to Live With Right to Die, THm TZMS UNION, Nov. 20, 1996, at A10;
Aaron Epstein, Suicide OpponentsReceive Legal Boost From White House, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Nov. 13, 1996, at 2; Alfred Sommer, The Trouble With Rationing Health Care, BALTwIORE SUN,
Nov. 12, 1996, at 1lA.
Representative of the religious view of the matter is a letter from Joseph Cardinal
Bernadin, Archbishop of Chicago, as part of the Catholic Health Association's anicus curiae brief
to the United States Supreme Court in Quill v. Vacco and Washington v. Glucksberg. James A.
Serritella and James C. Geoly, Commentary: Uneasy Lessons To Live By, CEi. TRIB., Nov. 20,
1996, at 27. Cardinal Bernadin stated that: "There can be no such thing as a right to assisted
suicide' because there can be no legal and moral order which tolerates the killing of innocent
human life, even if the agent of death is self-administered." He went on to note that "even a
person who decides to forgo treatment does not necessarily choose death. Rathcr, he chooses life
without the burden of disproportionate medical intervention." Id.
Source discussing both sides of the issue: Respect For the Dying, BOSTON GLOBB, Nov.
14, 1996, at A26.
4
Many states are against the decisions rendered in both of the physician-assisted suicide
cases currently before the Supreme Court. About twenty states collaborated in [ling two amicus
curiae briefs supporting the denial of constitutional protection for assisted ,uicide. Assisted
Suicide:Administration to Seek Ban on Practice,HEALTH LINE, Nov. 12, 1996. States joining
in this friend-of-the-court action include Alabama, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia,
Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee and Virginia. Id.
5
Melinda Lee, et al., LegalizingAssisted Suicide: Views ofPhysiciansin Oregon, 334 NEmv
ENG. J. MED., 310 (1996); Jerald G. Bewitchment et al., Attitudes offMichigan Physiciansand
the Public TowardLegalizingPhysician-AssistedSuicide and Voluntary Euthanasia,334 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 303 (1996); Mark A. Hall, Informed Consent to RationingDecisions, 71 MILBANK
Q. 645 (1993); Safeguarding the Health Care of Senior Citizens, 1996: HearingsBefore the
Subcomm. On Labor, Health and Human Services and Education, of the Senate Comm. on
Appropriation, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996)(statement of John C. Nelson, M.D. for the Am.
Med. Assoc.); Robert H. Jerry, II, Health Insurance Coveragefor High-Cost Health Care:
Reflections on the Rainmaker, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 1347 (1996).
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industry. A significant portion of America's health-care system is rapidly
moving towards managed care in all of its various forms (i.e., health
maintenance organizations (HMOs), preferred provider organizations
(PPOs), etc.). These organizational structures are based on the economic
needs of financing and delivering care in a for-profit, cost-conscious and
resource-constrained environment. 6
The legal implications of these economic drivers, however, have not
been adequately recognized or even addressed in recent court opinions on
physician-assisted suicide.
Neglecting the reality of economic
considerations in the health-care industry and how these considerations
interact and influence personal autonomy and state interests only serves to
undermine well-intentioned efforts by parties on both sides who are
struggling to answer the physician-assisted suicide question.
Society cannot hope to determine an appropriate solution until it first
formulates the relevant dimensions of the question. While the Supreme
Court's reversal of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Compassionin Dying
and the Second Circuit's decision in Quill was fully anticipated, the
Court's opinions were insufficient for a long-term resolution of the assisted
suicide issue.7 By allowing the contested statutes to pass constitutional
muster without fleeting mention of the economic aspects of the states'
interests in assisted suicide, the Court did a disservice to the contending
parties and to society itself. Unless the states' compelling interests in
regulating the contending economic factors are explicitly recognized and
validated, informed debate on assisted suicide in the state legislatures will
not be meaningfully conducted.

6

For ease of reference in this Article, all of these related organizational tp-s Mll be

collectively referred to as managed care.
7
Jan Crawfcrd Greenburg, JusticesAppear Skeptical About A Right To Die, CHao. Tpm.,

Jan. 9, 1997 § 1, at 1, 26. During the oral arguments before the Supreme Court on January 8,
1997, Justices were hesitant about the need to make any constitutional ruling. Many of the
Justices appeared content to leave the question to the discretion of the states. The Justices

suggested that the courts were ill-equipped to decide an issue that is as much about morality and
ethics as it is about the law. Id. at 26. The general focus was on the need for or irrelevance of
limiting a constitutional right to die to people who are on the threshold of death. The Justices

were concerned why the Constitution would not grant others the same right. Id. Noticeably
absent from this discussion was any exploration concerning the proper judicial respanse to the
underlying economic drivers that appear to be shaping the overall assisted suicide issue.
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Without recognition of the true underlying interests that affect healthcare decisions and the financial constraints under which they are made, any
public debate concerning individual autonomy or the basis for potentially
rationing scarce health-care resources will be rerldered almost
inconsequential. Such a result is analogous to a physician's placing a
misleading focus on the size, shape and color of the bandage to affix
externally to a wound, while ignoring the fatal internal problems actually
responsible for the patient's serious condition.
The Ninth Circuit in Compassion in Dying and the Second Circuit in
Quill each based their opinions on different provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment; Compassion in Dying on the Due Process Clause,8 and Quill
on the Equal Protection Clause.9 Yet these appellate courts shared

common ground in their perfunctory articulation of a state's interests in the
economic factors present in both cases." The Supreme Court gave its
major attention to the analysis of the Ninth Circuit's opinion in
Compassion in Dying, and thus, this case will serve as the basis for a
discussion of state interests in physician-assisted suicide."' The Court's
opinion in Vacco v. Quill was largely limited to an equal protection
analysis of the relation between withdrawing and withholding as compared
with assisted suicide.
This Article will use Compassionin Dying to identify and explore the
legal community's neglect of any real inclusion of economic factors in
deliberating the concerns presented by physician-assisted suicide. Part I
will review the historical backgrounds of key legal, cultural, and economic
forces that form the basis of the current assisted-suicide environment. Part
II examines the arguments given by the Ninth Circuit for recognizing a
right to physician assisted suicide in Compassion in Dying, paying
particular attention to the parties' stated issues and oblique references to
economic factors. Part III will discuss the economic factors underlying the
growing trend towards managed-care delivery of health care services. The
significance of cost-containment strategies to maintain the viability and
profitability of these organizations will also be noted. It is in the interplay
'Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790,793-94 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
9
Quill
0

v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 731 (2d Cir. 1966).

' Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 816-17, and Quill, 80 F.3d at 729-31.
"Id.
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of cost-containment efforts, personal-autonomy interests, and states'
interests where the undiscussed, yet critical influence on the physicianassisted suicide decision should take place. Part IV will conclude with a
suggestion for ending the legal community's predilection for discussing
interwoven issues in isolation. An argument for integrating both legal and
societal-based concerns into the judicial system will be offered.
BACKGROUND
Those aspects of the physician-assisted suicide question which do not
directly center on personal autonomy, moral, or ethical issues may be said
to be based in three areas: common law origins of the state's interest in
suicide; cultural biases in health-care delivery prevalent in the United
States; and the economic evolution of the organization and funding of
health-care provision in this country. Examination of the historical role
and contribution of each of these areas provides a needed perspective often
absent from current legal discussions on the physician-assisted suicide
issue.
Common Law Origins Of State Interest
In Preventing Suicide
Early English common law dealing with suicide was based on the canon
law of the Roman Catholic Church, dating back to the actions of the
Council of Hereford in 673.' The penalty levied on those who committed
suicide was the withholding of a Christian burial and the defilement of the
body itself by putting a stake through the corpse, and placing the corpse
on the open roadway.13 By the year 967, this ecclesiastical condemnation
was expanded by King Edgar's pronouncement that, not only would the
person who cornmitted suicide be denied a Christian burial and his body be
defiled, the person's material possessions would also be forfeited to his
feudal lord.14
2
'F
aria T. CeloCruz, Note and Conment. Aid-in-Dying: Should We Dccriminalize

Physician-AssistedSuideandPhysician-ComdttcdEuthawnasia?
18 AL.
. L & MIm. 369,373
(1992).
34 WmnAm BLAcKsToNE, ComniTARMES ON THE lAws OF NGL ND * 190.
14CeloCruz,supranote 12, at 373.
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Much later, in the fourteenth century, when suicide was proclaimed
to be a felony, the Royal Treasury became the sole benefactor and received
the suicide's possessions." The state's interest in suicide was succinctly
summarized by Blackstone, noting that "[a] suicide is guilty of a double
offense: one spiritual, in evading the prerogative of the Almighty, and
rushing into his immediate presence uncalled for, the other temporal,
against the king, who hath an interest in the preservation of all his
"16
subjects ....
Later, this legal condemnation of suicide was extended to those who
sought to assist acts of suicide by declaring such assistance to be akin to
a felony.17 It is only in this century that suicide penalties in the United
States have been decriminalized."8 Three reasons often cited for this
deciminalization are: suicide is essentially an unpunishable crime because
the person comnitting it does not survive the act; forfeiture of goods is an
unwarranted punishment of the innocent family of the suicide; and suicide
can be regarded as the act of an ill person who needs treatment rather than
punishment.' 9

Thus, a state's traditional interest in preventing suicide has been
attributed to three origins: religious belief, filling the king's coffers, and
protecting the psychologically unsound from harming themselves.2"
Although additional state interests in opposing suicide (interests which are
to be weighed against a person's right to refuse medical assistance) have
not been universally recognized, recent court decisions have noted they
include preserving life, protecting family members, precluding the use of
arbitrary, unfair or undue influence, and protecting the integrity of the
medical profession."

's1d.

16BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at *189.

'Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 425, 428-29 (Mass. 1977) (noting that duo to
the not punishable nature of the act, suicide was not a felony in the techniccl meaning of that
term, but rather, malum in se).
18
CeloCruz,supra note 12, at 375.
' 91d.

201d. at 375-76.
'Cornpassion in Dying v. State ofWashington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994), 49
F.3d 586,592-93 (9th Cir. 1995), 79 F.3d 790, 816-17, (9th Cir. 1966) (en banc); Quill v. Vacco,
80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1966); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370
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Cultural Biases In United States
Health-Care Delivery
There is no universally recognized structure for delivering health care.

Each country delivers health care in a manner that reflects its own cultural
values and social preferences. " Even a cursory comparative review of
key features of the United States health-care system versus those of other
countries reveals a host of social differences which translate into dissimilar
medical delivery systems?' The cultural biases which underlie these
structural differences serve to shape the questions that can be addressed by
each system.
The cultural differences are readily apparent. For example, in contrast
to the United States emphasis on a free-market system, the German
government has, since the time of Chancellor, used a social-insurance
approach to health care. The German people believe "[tihe welfare of the
people does not result automatically out of economic growth in a freemarket economy. [T]he distribution has to be regulated, and the state
should not limit itself to providing economic freedom."
Thus, the
German health-care system of mandatory enrollment in sickness funds
based on occupational status, reflects the belief that "political stability can
be achieved by cementing individual loyalties to social groups."2 5 A
person's contribution to state-administered health-care premiums is
N.E.2d 417,425 (Mass. 1977).
Robert J. Blendcx, et aL,DataWatch: Who Has the Best Health-CareSystem? A Second

Look, 14 HEATH AFAs 220 (1995); Annette Fianagin, RN, MA (Editor), LtterFrom ViennaHealthCarein Austia: UniversalAccess, NationalHealth Insurance,andPrivateHealth Care,
269 JAMA 2789 (June 2,1993); JdmK.Iglehart, HealthPolicy Report: Germany'sHealth-Care

System, (pts. 1 & 2), 324 NEw ENG. I. MED. 503, 1750 (1991); Naoki Ikegami, M.D., and John
C. Campbell, Ph.D., SpecialReport:Medical Carein Japan,333 NEW E:'NG. J. MIED. 1295 (Nov.
9, 1995); Magne Nylenna, M.D., Letter From Oslo-Norway's Decentralized,Single-Payer

Health System Faces Great Challenges,274 JAMA 120 (July 12, 1995); R.R. Orford, M.D.,
Comrentary: Reflections on the CanadianandAmericanHealth-CareSystems, 66 MAYo CLTi.
PRoc. 203 (Feb. 1993); Marlise Simons, DutchParliamentApprovesLawPermittingEuthanasia,
N.Y. TirEs, Feb. 10, 1993, A10 1, James Sterngold, Japan'sHealth Care: Cradle,Grave and

No Frills,N.Y. Tmis, Dec. 28, 1992, at Al 1 Craig R. Whitney, BritishHealthService, Much
Beloved But Inadequate,Is FacingChanges, N.Y. TImS, June 9, 1991, at 16 L
2Id.
4

John K. Iglehart, supranote 22, at 505.
2Id. at 505-06.
6Id. at 506.
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calculated as a fixed percentage of gross income--independent of the
employee's health risky
Such contributions have the intended
redistributive dimension.2
In Norway, as another example, access to health care is considered
the statutory'Tright" of all citizens. 29 However, no such concept of a legal
right to health care exists in the United States.
The legal concept of informed medical consent, similarly, has different
cultural bases in the United States and Japan. In the United States, courts
recognize a person's right to make decisions concerning his or her body by
emphasizing a physician's duty to disclose pertinent information to a
patient." This is at marked variance with the approach taken in Japan
where the doctrine of informed consent has yet to be accepted." Personal
autonomy is regarded as egocentric and thus out of keeping with the
Japanese cultural tradition.32 The Japanese believe "each human being is
dependent on others in the family, and [on the] social, economic and
political communities." 3 In this cultural setting, informing a patient's
family about a medical condition, but not the patient herself, is considered
socially, and therefore, medically acceptable conduct by a physician.'M
The question of physician-assisted suicide emerging in the United
States, therefore, cannot necessarily be resolved by adopting solutions
employed in other nations. Country-to-country differences are further
strained if an attempt is made to overlay them onto equally divergent legal
systems. Although lessons can be learned in a trans-cultural analysis, any
comprehensive resolution to the physician-assisted suicide question will be
unique to the United States and its own particular cultural environment.

21Id.
2nld.
2Magne Nylenna, supra note 22, at 123.
3Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
31
George J. Annas and Frances H. Miller, The Empire of Death: How Culture and
EconomicsAffect Informed Consent in the U.S., the U.K., andJapan,20 AM. J. L AND MED. 357,
372 (1994). Informed consent is a broad area, but one whose implications for physician-assisted
suicide32can only be briefly noted within the limited scope of this article.
1d at 374.
33
3

d.

41d. at 373-74.
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Perhaps the most unique feature of United States health care is the
economic basis on which it is built.
The Economic Evolution of Health-Care
Organizational Structures and
Funding Mechanisms
The interplay of health-care delivery and funding has evolved in significant
ways since the founding of the Republic. This section will first discuss
how the path to the present situation was created by a change from
personal payments for medical services to a growing reliance on insurance
for reimbursing health-care providers. Next, the indemnity format of that
insurance is reviewed, particularly with respect to how it laid the
foundation for later cost containment problems. After the indemnity
format review, the discussion will examine how these cost containment
problems lead to a search for newer funding mechanisms and incentives in
providing care. This section will conclude with a discussion of how
managed-care organizations have begun to address the problems of upward
spiraling health-care costs.
The Use Of Health Insurance
Grew Rapidly
Paying for health care in the United States remained the personal
responsibility of individual patients until the early decades of the twentieth
century.35 Insurance was rare for individuals, and only a very few firms,
such as Montgomery Ward, made health insurance available as an
employment fringe benefit.3" Employer offerings of health insurance first
became commonplace during World War II as a means of attracting
workers and overcoming the effects of tight labor markets and strict,
government-inposed wage controls.37

sGEoRGEANDERS, HA LTHAGASTWALTH: HMOs AND THE BRa*=,VVN oFNMIECAL
TRusT, 19 (1996).
"Id.
'AMilton S. Friedman, Dr. Friedman'sRxfor Health Care, BARRON'S, Jan. 24, 1994, at
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Since then, health-care insurance in the United States has developed
haphazardly, largely free from central control by the goverrment.38 By the
end of the 1940s, the total outlay for health-care services amounted to only
four percent of the gross national product.39 Additionally, as a result of the
excellent medical care received during the war, returning veterans and
Americans who stayed at home had increased expectations about their
health care. Consequently, when the postwar economy rapidly accelerated,
private health-care insurance was something unions demanded and to
which corporate America readily acquiesced.40
Indemnity Insurance Planted The
Seeds Of The Health-Care
Cost Containment Problem
Until recently, the majority of health-care insurance was purchased mainly
by employers, in various versions, as an indemnity. Medical services were
supplied in response to demand by physicians on behalf of their patients,
with insurance carriers reimbursing hospitals, physicians, and other medical
providers for each visit or procedure perfonmed.41 Under this arrangement,
referred to as "fee-for-service," medical providers were free to set their
own fees.42 Patients enjoyed an unlimited choice of providers and paid
only an annual deductible amount plus a fixed portion of their medical bills
in the form of a co-insurance payment.43
Charges for medical care went essentially unchallenged by corporate
paymasters due to a national attitude of deference to physician judgment. 44
Despite rising premium costs, employers saw health insurance as both
prudent and affordable. 45

'Anders, supra note 35, at 19.
9
1d. Gross national product is the label given to the total amount of all goods and services
produced by the United States economy in any given year.
401d. at 20.
41
Christopher Biddle & Maureen Lopes, Managed CarePlansNo. 1 Among Employers,

42 N.L42Bus. 20 (1996).
1d.

4Id.
44

Anders, supranote 35, at 23.
MId. at 20.
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Rising Health Insurance Costs Mandated
A Need For New Incentives
In Delivering Care
The attitude of employers, who paid the bulk of health insurance
premiums, changed dramatically, however, as this payment and practice
system took hold. Joseph Califano, a director on the Chrysler Corporation
board, voiced the frustrations of corporate executives when he complained
that "by agreeing to first-dollar coverage, Chrysler increasingly insulated
its employees from any sense of what health care cost."' The net effect
of this, he noted, was that "Chrysler opened its treasury door to physicians
and hospitals.' 47

Insured workers' health-care costs began to rapidly spiral. From
1980 to 1994, health-care inflation increased annually at an average rate of
7.7 percent, compared to only a 4.3 percent increase for the consumer
price index in the same period.' It was as 49though the mere existence of
the benefit was generating its own demand.
With medical inflation rampant by the 1980s, the health-care
community began to lose its "aura of untouchability. '""- Researchers began
to document irrefutable instances of medical excess and inappropriate
procedures. 51 After decades of trying to contain the growth of health-care
cost increases, employers concluded nothing worked, and "all incentives
worked in the direction toward overtreatment." ' Insurers and employers
cam to realize that to effectively control costs, incentives to the redical
community had to be changed. The way to do this was to intervene
4JoSEPH
A. CALmA OJR., Aim, cA's HaLTH CARE REvoLtrno:, 14 (1936).
41
d.
4

1NATIONAL CENM

FOR HEALTH STATISICS, HEALTH, UNITED STATES 1994 CHART

BooK, at 32, Fig. 18.

"Anders, supra note 35, at 20-21. In 1946, a day in the hospital cost S9.39. By 1985 it
rose to over $600, before accounting for medical tests and physician fees.
5Id. at 23.
'Id at 23-24. For example, in Stowe, Vermont, pediatricians performed tonsillectomies
on over two-thirds of all children. This proved to be three times the rate performed in surrounding

towns. Researchers found that the sole reason for this difference was simply the preference that
Stowe physicians had for surgery.

Similarly, researchers at the Rand Ccquatti

found that fourteen percent of all expensive,

coronary
by)pass surgeries, and sixteen percent of hysterectomies were not medically required.
52
d. at 25.
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before physicians saw a patient.53 This novel intervention is now known
as managed care. s4
Managed Care Offers A Solution

To Rising Costs
All forms of managed-care providers (HMO, IPA, PPO, etc.) 55 share one

essential characteristic. They receive capitated payment, a fixed amount
of money per year for each person who becomes a member of their
group. 56 This capitated payment feature means once a person is enrolled
in a managed-care group, management's focus is on controlling health-care
costs rather than increasing revenues.57 If the total expenses of caring for
53

1d.
1Id. Note, however, that although the recent growth of managed-care organizations was
in response to increasing costs of health-care insurance, the earliest managed-care organizations
developed for different purposes. Such pioneering organizations as Kaiser Permanente
(established in the 1940's to serve the health needs of employees of the Kaiser shipyards) were
rather socialist in their approach. Id. at 27.
55
I'hese sets of initials stand for the prominent methods of providing medical services in
a prepaid manner via entities that combine both the delivery of services with some form of
financing mechanism. They are defined as follows in VERGIL N. SLEE, M.D., HEALTH CARE

TMMs, (1986).
A Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) is any organization, either for profit or
nonprofit, that accepts responsibility for the provision and delivery of a predetermined set of
comprehensive health maintenance and treatment services to a group of volsantarily enrolled
people at a preset, fixed, and periodic capitation payment. HMO's consist of three components:
the health plan, which provides organization and management; the provic'ers (physicians,
hospitals, laboratories, etc.); and the patients (subscribers or enrollees). Id. at 60.
An Independent Physician Association (IPA) is a type of provider organization composed
ofphysicians where the physicians maintain their own practices, but agree to also fumish medical
services to patients who have signed up for a prepayment plan of medical services. Id. at 67.
A Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) is a form of health insurance in which certain
physicians are designated by a third party payer (the insurance plan) as providers of medical
services to be preferred by plan members because they are cost-effective. When a beneficiary
elects to receive care from these physicians, the charges are paid in full-there is no additional
charge to the plan member. The plan member may elect to obtain care from other physicians who
are not affiliated with the plan (i.e. are not preferred). If the plan member selects this option,
however, a financial penalty consisting of charges not covered by the plan are levied against the
plan member. Id. at 111.
mAnders, supranote 35, at 26.
57
Strictly speaking, providing specific health-care services is not the only way in which
managed-care groups experience costs. They also pay for the expenses associated with the
enrollment process itself. This necessarily entails employing large marketing staffs and
allocating significant dollar amounts for the advertising and promotional activ .ties required to
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a given patient are below the fixed annual premium, then the managed-care
group will keep the difference as its profit for providing cost-effective
58
care.
Naturally, managed-care groups with larger percentages of younger
and healthier members do not incur much expense in keeping this already
healthy cadre of members healthy. In fact, managed-care groups strive to
maximize revenues by enrolling greater numbers of younger and healthier
members.59 But the other side of the equation is where the problem for
managed-care firms resides.' If the cost of providing medical services to
any given patient exceeds the annual premium, then the managed-care
organization loses money on that patient.6" As a result, managed-care
groups are economically motivated to enroll younger, healthier people and
to be cost conscious when providing medical care.' z
The growth of managed-care organizations continues at a rapid pace.
A study conducted by three managed-care trade organizations forecast
enrollments will increase by 48.5 percent from 1996 to 2002.3 The reason
behind this tremendous rate of increase is that managed-care organizations
have been successful in achieving their prime objective of reining in the rate
of growth of health-care costs.'
This history of health-care insurance and the current supremacy of the
managed-care approach exerts a pivotal influence on the timing and
conduct of the physician-assisted suicide issue.

attract and maintain membership rolls. In its simplest conceptual form, the economics of
managed-care organizations are more easily thought of using enrollment related activities to
generate revenues, and cost-cutting regimes to limit expenses and produce the overall goal of

making5 profits and increasing shareholder value.
'ROBERT G. SHouwIcE & KATHERINE H. SHoumICE, MIEDicAL GROUP PRACCEI AD
HEALTH M5NqENANcE ORGANIZATIONS, 123-29 (1978).
sAnders, supranote 35, at 26,41.
6WSHOuLDiCE AND SHouuxcE, supra note 58, at 123-29.
61
d.

6SAnders, supranote 35, at 26,41.
'Mary

Jane Fisher, Anti-Managed Care Law Could Cost Billions: Study, NAT'L.

UNDERR
wrE= LiFE & HEA-T-FINAJcvL SERv. ED., July 3, 1995, at 49.
61d.
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LEADING PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED
SUICIDE CASE
As noted in the Introduction, although the appellate courts in Compassion
in Dying and Quill each based their opinions on different provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment, they both shared common ground in giving scant
attention to a state's interests in the economic factors present in physicianassisted suicide cases.'
Compassion in Dying posed two related questions: whether a person
who is terminally-ill has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
hastening his or her own death; and whether the state of Washington could
constitutionally restrict the exercise of this liberty interest by banning a
form of medical assistance that is requested by terminally-ill people who
wish to die.6
The issues arose out of a Washington statute which provided: "A
person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes
or aids another to attempt suicide."6'7 These issues were finally resolved by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc,
after having been reviewed by the district court and a three member panel
of the Ninth Circuit.' This procedural history is important because of the
light it sheds on the choice of factors each court identified as germane to
physician-assisted suicide.
The Courts Do Not Agree On A List Of The Key
Relevant Factors That Influence
Physician-Assisted Suicide
Surprisingly, the district and appellate courts failed to agree on a single set
of relevant factors affecting physician-assisted suicide that were to be
scrutinized, weighed, and balanced. The absence of common criteria for
assessing the legality of physician-assisted suicide reveals an underlying
confusion about exactly what should be evaluated. In such an unsettled
65

Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790,793-94 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
'Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 793.
67RCW 9A.36.060.
6Ccmpassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1944), 49 F.3d 586
(9th Cir. 1995), 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
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environment, symptoms can easily be mistaken for causes. As a result,
judicial analysis may not capture important factors in the legal equation.
In the case of physician-assisted suicide, the omission of economic drivers
which inform and to some extent control other factors has seriously eroded
the practical value of the courts' opinions.
Conspicuously absent from the following discussion of factors
deemed important by each of the three courts are the words "economics,"
"financial," "business concerns," or comparable words relating to the
underlying marketplace drivers that are increasingly shaping medical
treatment decisions.69 Although economic influences can potentially be

inferred from some of the language employed, failure to explicitly include
such influences is tantamount to omitting them entirely. This omission
makes it difficult, if not impossible, to fully address the underlying
economics of the physician-assisted suicide decision.
As will be discussed in Part II, the economic dimension of the
problem becomes critical when one places the physician-assisted suicide
decision within the context of its real-world, managed-care environment.
In determining whether a liberty interest was impeded by the statute, the
en bane court enumerated five relevant factors:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

the importance of various state interests;
the manner in which those interests are furthered by the state law;
the importance of the liberty interest;
the extent to which that interest is burdened by the state action; and
the consequences of upholding or overturning the statute.7

'Literally speakdng, the Compassionin Dying enbanc court does refer to financial burdens
in its opinion. Id at 826. However, monetary matters are considered solely from the perspcctive
of potential burdens to self-interested relatives or an unnamed group of "others who have
influence over them." Id Yet this concern is of an entirely different and diminished magnitude
than that presented by explicit recognition of the presence of tha managed-care industry.
Focusing only on a few relatives' interests ignores the enormous economic pressures exerted by
the managed-care firms on the physicians with whom patients must ultimately and intimately
interact. This article argues that failure to consider the significant economic power repre-sented
by the new managed-care environment is synonymous with neglecting to recognize a key, but
silent actor, in the drama of assisted suicide.
7
0Id. at 793.
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The factors focused on in this Article are the first and fourth because they
address interests which may have some relationship to economic
considerations.
There Is No Settled List Of State Interests
In Assisted Suicide
State interests are a critical consideration because the decision regarding
whether a patient's constitutional rights have been violated "must be
determined by balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state
interests." ' Not surprisingly, these interests were included in the list of
important factors considered by each of the three courts. The district court
simply focused on the twin state interests of preventing suicide and
preventing undue influence and abuse. 7
The three member panel of the Ninth Circuit was more particular in
its list of key state interests to be weighed and balanced aginst the rights
of the individual patient. Five factors comprised the list of state interests:
(1) not having physicians in the role of killing their patients;
(2) not subjecting the elderly or infirm to psychological pressure to
consent to their own deaths;
(3) protecting the poor and minorities from exploitation;
(4) protecting handicapped from societal indifference and apathy; and
(5) preventing the kind of abuse that has occurred in the Netherlands,
where, since 1984, legal guidelines have tacitly allowed assisted
suicide or euthanasia in response to a repeated request from a
suffering, competent patient."
The Compassion in Dying court came closest to considering
economic factors in items three and four when it referred to "psychological
pressure" and protecting the poor and minorities from ati unspecified
"exploitation." As will be seen in Part lII, however, these oblique

"'Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982).

7,Ccmpassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1464-65 (WD. Wash. 1994).
7Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 592-93 (9th Cir. 1995).
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inferences do not directly raise the considerable economic issues that
require specific legal attention in a managed-care environment.
The en banc court also elaborated on the elements it believed
described the state's interests. These include:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

preserving life;
preventing suicide;
protecting the integrity of the nedical profession;
avoiding adverse consequences if the statute was declared
unconstitutional;
(5) protecting family members; and
(6) avoiding the involvenent of third parties and their potential use of
arbitrary, unfair or undue influence.74
At best, suggestions of economic components can only be gleaned from the
last two elements on the court's list.
It is apparent from both the district and circuit courts' opinions there
was no agreed upon set of state interests which guided those courts when
dealing with the issue of physician-assisted suicide. Certainly, the
economic influences exerted by the growing managed-care sector of the
health-care industry were nowhere to be found among the specific factors
considered by these courts.
As discussed in the next section, this omission holds potentially
dangerous consequences for people seeking to exercise their autonomy
interests in this area. The related issue of rationing health-care services
due to limited resources has been discussed in other contexts by legal
authors.75 But these considerations have similarly failed to integrate with
the personal autonomy, liberty interests, and moral/ethical concerns as they
relate to the question of physician-assisted suicide.
74

Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, S16-17 (91h Cr. 1996) (en banc).
Paul S. Applebaum, Must We Forgo Informed Consentto ControlHcalth CareCosts?
71 MBANK Q. 669 (1993); Mark A. Hall, DisclosingRationing Dccisions:A Reply to PaulS.
Applebaum, 72 MmBANK Q. 211 (1994); Mark A. Hall, Informcd Conscn to Rationing
Decisions,71 MIn.ANK Q. 645 (1993); Mark A. Hall, Rationing Health CareAt The Bcdside,
69 N.Y.U. L REV. 693 (1994); David Mechanic, Trust andInformcd Consent to Rationing,72
MmBANK Q. 217 (1994).
75
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ECONOMIC FACTORS DRIVING
PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
Regardless of the extent of a patient's personal autonomy interests, the
exercise of those interests in decisions affecting physician-assisted suicide
does not exist in isolation. Rather, the exercise of autonomy may itself be
influenced by information available to the patient at the point of decisionmaking. Since most patients are not sophisticated consumers of medical
information, they often rely on physicians to interpret the data and make
treatment recommendations "in the patient's best interests."76 This is the
traditionally accepted view of the physician-patient relationship.
With the emergence of managed-care organizational structures,
however, powerful forces are rapidly reshaping the practice of medicine,
not simply by controlling costs, but by fundamentally altering the
physician's view of the physician-patient relationship.77

Thus, it is

necessary to understand the role played by managed-care organizations in
order to fully understand the context in which any exercise of a patient's
personal autonomy is likely to occur.
A number of critical, interrelated economic factors must be explicitly
included in any legal equation that seeks to resolve the physician-assisted
suicide issue. One section discusses managed-care issues as they relate to
physician-assisted suicide in the contexts of the elderly, the changing roles
of physicians, and the physician-patient relationship in general. Another
section then assesses state interests in protecting vulnerable groups from
being unduly influenced by professionals, and the interest in protecting
consumers from potential economic abuse. Finally, a section will examine
the significant experience of the Netherlands with euthanasia guidelines
because that experience has many implications for the monitoring and
control of potential abuse in physician-assisted suicide.

76

Patients do not possess the data or, often, the analytical abilities, needed to effectively
interact with physicians on a co-equal basis. The unfortunate result of this disparity in bargaining
power is an undermining of the patient's theoretical capacity to allocate risks through this market
mechanism. Michael B. Kelly, The Rightful Positionin "Wrongful Life" Actions, 42 HAsTiNos
L.. 505, 511.
'Erik Larson, The Soul of an HMO, TaME, Jan. 22, 1996, at 45.
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The Advent Of Managed Care Has Accelerated
The Need To Explore The Question
Of Assisted Suicide
A question rarely posited in the controversy over assisted suicide is why
the issue is being debated now. What factors have coalesced to create
increased attention to physician-assisted suicide? A case may be made
which attempts to explain the current impetus as the result of advances in
modem medical technology. But such an explanation falls far short of
conclusively demonstrating why interest in assisted suicide is now
capturing nationwide attention. After all, technological progress in
medicine has occurred on numerous fronts throughout this century, yet
none have ever sparked sustained interest in physician-assisted suicide.
What is uniquely different now is the creation and expansion of new,
integrated health-care organizational structures and funding mechanisms.
The significant shift to a managed-care environment provides compelling
economic reasons which, in themselves, practically require the introduction
of physician-assisted suicide as an acceptable treatment option.
In assessing the economic role managed care plays in health-care
delivery, seven critical areas will be discussed:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

managed care's singular focus on price and cost;
the overall crucial interplay of costs and quality,
the impact on the elderly,
the general implications for assisted suicide;
the adverse changes in physician-patient relationships;
the emergence of clinical outcome measurements; and
the impacts of managed-care economics on physician choices for
patient care.

The Singular Focus on Price and Cost
Raises Questions About Proper
Incentives and Priorities
Managed-care organizations have a critical need to ensure they provide

low cost medical treatment. 73 In actuality, this process is merely a means

7SAnders, supra note 35, at 26, 41.
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of setting a price for health-care services. Judge Richard Posner of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recognized this in
a recent antitrust case when he noted:
the different method of pricing used by the HMO has, of course,

consequences both for the practice of medicine and the allocation of
risk of medical expenses. The method of pricing gives the HMO an
incentive to minimize the procedures that it performs, tsince the
marginal revenue it derives from each procedure is zero."
Managed-care groups' relentless pursuit of botton-line savings,
however, is beginning to diverge from some employers' objectives of
providing employees with reasonably priced, quality health care. This
point is illustrated by a managed-care group that was unable to extract a
stiff, percent price reduction from Seattle's renowned Swedish Medical
Center. s° The managed-care firm promptly dropped the Center from its
approved list of providers, substituting an arguably lower quality but
cheaper facility."' Boeing, the largest area employer, believed good care
was comprised of more than cost savings and as a result, withdrew its
support of the managed care plan.' The managed-care group, however,
refused to alter its single, cost-based focus.8 3 Its chief executive officer
unabashedly stated he felt Boeing's "major priority was not to control costs
but to keep their employees happy.... I'm sure that when we talk with
them again, their priorities will be different. ' '84
The Overall Interplay of Costs and Acceptable
Levels of Quality Becomes Crucial
Even if managed-care firms and employers share identical priorities
regarding low costs, the question of quality treatment remains. The pursuit
of greater cost efficiencies has unquestionably been a successful outcome
'Blue Cross and Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1409 (7th

Cir. 1995).
'Anders, supra note 35, at 44.
8
71d.
12Id.
3Id.

1Id.
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of the movement towards managed care.' The drive to obtain such
efficiencies, however, threatens to become the all-consuming goal of
managed-care groups, to the detriment of quality care. A brief look at
mortality rates for open heart surgery illustrates this point.
When coronary-artery-bypass-graft surgery (CABG)' became widely
accepted, one west coast hospital attracted managed-care contracts by
dramatically slashing its price for the procedure from $60,000 to an allinclusive $23,000.9 Competition among hospitals for managed-care
contracts eventually drove prices down to about $13,000. 90 Unfortunately,
the quality of care patients received declined almost as rapidly as the cost.
Between 1991 and 1993, CABG patients at the same west coast
hospital died on site or within thirty days of their operations at a rate of
10.4 percent, which was among the highest rates of high-volume heart
centers in the region.91 In contrast, two other area hospitals, noted for
handling unusually sick patients, posted mortality rates of only 7.9 percent
and 5.6 percent respectively.9' One managed-care executive's comnent
regarding the cost versus survival rate trade-offs was that "flor a 2 to 3
percent difference in mortality, Im not willing to spend an extra $40,000
per case." 93

5ANDERs, supra note 35, at 182.

'Seeklng cost-saving efficiencies is so prevalent that the managed-care industry refers to
it with a term borrowed from conventional insurance lexicon. Managed-care firms consider the

funds that they allocate for actual patient care to be their "medical loss ratio." Thus, they directly
associate patient care with financial loss rather than with a benefit or service which they are

contractually obligated to provide. TuelveReasons Wiy For-ProfitManaged CareIsn't Working
For PhysiciansOrPatients,HFALTH Lzrra, (Public Citizen Health Research Group, Wash.

D.C.), Dec. 1996, at 2.
WANDERS, supranote 35, at 101-03.
'Id. at 96. CABG is pronounced "cabbage."

"Id. at 96-98.
1Id. at 98-99.
91
Id. at 99. These figures are taken from Medicare mortality data. Medicare figures are
used because some states, such as California where the statistics for this example were derived,
do not collect mortality data for all heart-surgery patients. The Medicare mortality rates tend to
be higher than for other such patients, yet they are considered to provide an accurate gauge of
how a hospital handles sicker individuals.

92ANDERs, supranote 35, at 100.
9Id.
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These quality/cost trade-off issues call into question the ability or
desire of managed-care organizations to control health-care expenditures,
yet provide effective care, as they face increasing pressure from the
demographic realities of an aging population. As the percentage of elderly
4
in the population increases, more health-care services will be required.

Because the economic strength of managed care lies solely in its ability to
control costs, the mechanisms used to manage expenses become key
considerations in confronting the specter of rising costs generated by this
increasingly elderly population.95
According to researchers Lubitz and Riley, the highest medical costs

occur in the last year of life. 6 Although this conclusion is based on
Medicare data,97 it serves as a benchmark for more generalized
observations. Overall, these numbers are compatible with similar data for

the costs of caring for terminally-ill patients suffering from cancer, as well
as patients who die following a stay in a critical care unit. 98 Analysis of data
from whatever source, however, is complicated by the fact relationships

between "prognosis, expenditure, and outcome are more complex than can
be appreciated when a study focuses only on nonsurvivors or on subsets

of patients with the poorest prognosis or the highest costs.""
Even with these limitations, the costs associated with the terminally-rll

remain significant. Focusing on the available Medicare information for the
94

PAUL J. FELDSTE]N, HEALTH Poucy IssuEs: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE ON HEALTH
REFORM,258-61 (1994).
9Alfred F. Conrad, Elder Choices, 19 AM. I. L. & MED. 233, 240-41 (1993). The rise in

per capita health-care expenditures is exacerbated by the rate of growth of the elderly versus
overall population growth rates. While the total population has increased by twenty-six percent,
the elderly segment (i.e. people aged eighty-five or older) has grown by art
astonishing 126
percent.
96
James D. Lubitz & Gerald F. Riley, Trends in MedicarePayments in the Last Year of
Life, 328 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1092, 1092 (1993).
This widespread view has recently been criticized based on differing interpretations of the
data. See End of Life Issues and Implementation of Advance Directives UrderHealth Care
Reform: Hearingbefore the Senate Comm. on Finance, 103rd Congress, 2d Sess. 54 (1994)
(testimony of Ezekiel . Emanual). Some of the difference of opinion stems from the fact that the
definition of costs near time of death is a complex issue.
Lubitz & Riley, supranote 96, at 1092.
9RonaldBayer, et al, The Careof the Terminally Ill: Morality and Economics, 309 NEW
ENG. L MED. 1490, 1491,(1983).
99Id. at 1492.
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terminally-ill, one can conclude that although these health-care costs have
not increased relative to other health-care expenses over time, their
absolute size continues to account for a significant portion of health-care
expenditures, about 29 percent.'00 The most significant component (77
percent) of these last year of life expenses was for hospital-based care,'
an area in which managed-care groups continue to exhibit strong interest
in controlling costs. As a consequence, the elderly remain an important
target group in the quest to control health-care costs.
Because death is most prevalent among the elderly, and because the
elderly are an increasing portion of the population,0 2 this group represents
the largest potential pool of patients who might be candidates for
physician-assisted suicide. Furthermore, because of the large percentage
of health dollars directed towards the care of those in their final year of life,
the majority of whom are elderly, the economic importance of this group
is significant in a managed-care environment where cost control is the
primary objective.
At the same time, the elderly possess adequate medical insurance and
are, therefore, a financially attractive group to managed-care organizations.
Medicare legislation in 1965 made this situation possible by ensuring the
availability of government-funded health coverage for anyone aged sixtyfive or older. 3 Prior to that time, the elderly were basically considered
uninsurable." a Today, the federal government pays an average of $400 per
month for each person enrolled in a Medicare-approved managed-care
group and managed-care groups have been quick to capitalize on this
additional source of funding.'05 By mid-1996, four million senior citizens
were enrolled in Medicare managed-care groups, with new membership
growth rates hovering at approximately 20 percent per year.1'*
10

Lubitz & Riley, supranote 96, at 1092-93 (finding that 29 percent of total Medicare

expenses was generated by only a small proportion of Medicare enrollees-for example, only six

percent of the enrollees who died in 1978).
.. Sally C. Steams, et aL, Risk IndfcatorsforHospitalizationDuring the Last Year ofLife,
31 HEALTH SERV. RES. 49 (1996).
1 2
" Conrad,supranote 95, at 240-41.
"03Anders, supranote 35, at 174.
04Id.
105d.

°MId. at 176.
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Even in the face of this enormous growth of annual Medicare
enrollment revenues, the managed-care industry has not, unfortunately,
changed its preferences for emphasizing cost savings over quality of care.
Treatment can easily be denied to the elderly through the simple expedient
of more stringently defining what is considered a "medical necessity."' 7
The government hears about 3,000 disputes each year where the elderly
contest these definitions and denials of treatment." 8 Of these,
approximately 40 percent are decided in favor of the elderly, resulting in
an additional managed-care firm financial obligation of $3 million to $8
million in services annually.1 9
Researchers are uncovering numerous examples of "disturbing gaps"
in the quality of care received by the elderly--gaps in care which only serve
to boost managed-care incomes. " In one study of stroke patients,
managed-care Medicare patients were found to have been discharged from
hospitals sooner and sicker than a control group of traditional fee-forservice Medicare patients."' Another group of researchers from Boston's
New England Medical Center, Tufts, and Harvard Univer,3ities recently
conducted a major four-year study of chronically-ill patients in Boston,
Chicago, and Los Angeles."' The research concluded elderly Medicare
patients and poor people who received care from HMOs experienced
worse health outcomes than those treated in traditional fee-for-service
settings."' A senior scientist at the New England Medical Center
summarized the results by stating: "The study clearly indicates that the
chronically-ill elderly and poor patients are at a greater risk in this new era
4
of cost containment that involves managed care.""

11

d. at 174.

IWANDERS, supra note 35, at 178.
1

09d.
1°Id. at 179.
1
1d. The managed-care patients were released an average of two full days sooner than
were members of the control group. This occurred even though at discharge the managed.care
patients "had more trouble talking, seeing clearly, or moving their arms and legs." Id.
Ronald Kotulak and Peter Garner, Managed Care:NationalLeap of Faith, CHGO. TRIB.,
Oct. 2, 1996 § 1, at 1.

1131d.
14
1d.
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Implications Of The Managed-Care
Environment On
Physician-Assisted Suicide
It is within the structure of managed-care organizations that the seeds of
the physician-assisted suicide controversy are sown. Managed-care
groups, by their nature, focus on strictly controlling costs when providing
medical care and operate under strong economic incentives. As a result,
these organizations may view physician-assisted suicide as an opportunity
to control the demonstratively high costs associated with patients, often the
elderly, who are candidates for the physician-assisted suicide option. Any
expenses saved in providing care to these patients drops directly to the
industry's bottom-line profits.
If sufficiently large numbers of these patients can be persuaded by
managed-care physicians to pursue or choose physician-assisted suicide
and die earlier than they might otherwise, managed-care organizations will
undoubtedly enhance their profits. Judge Posner has observed "[firom a
short-term financial standpoint ...
the HMO's incentive is to keep you
healthy if it can but if you get very sick, and are unlikely to recover to a
healthy state involving few mdical expenses, to let you die as quickly and
cheaply as possible.""1 5
Unfortunately, the specter of economically driven physician-assisted
suicide outlined above is not limited to some morbid, grade-B movie plot.
Concrete evidence of the desire and practice of managed-care firms to
actively pursue this attractive financial opportunity already exists. William
Jarvis, Professor of Public Health at California's Loma Linda University,
documented such cost savings from the terminally-ill as an openly admitted
goal of some managed-care groups." 6 He describes the situation of an
HMO that provides inexpensive dietary supplements for AIDS patients. 7
The managed-care firm actively pursues the use of this alternative to the
costly AZT drug even though the efficacy of the dietary treatment is

" 5Blue Cross and Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1410

(7th Cir. 1995).
1
7

-HlMO'sFlirtingWith Alternative Medicine, CHGO. TPIB., Oct. 7, 1996, § 1, at 7.

1 Id.
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uncertain at best." The reason given by an official of the HMO is that "it's
119
cheaper than AZT, and the patient won't be around as long .....
Such lucrative economic incentives assume increased significance in
a health-care environment in which an increasing number of people are
coming under the overall managed-care umbrella. Further, the significance
is greatest where increasing numbers of those people are the elderly who
are more likely to incur expensive terminal illnesses and, thus, become
prime candidates for the cost-saving physician-assisted suicide option.
A Managed-Care Approach Adversely
Changes Critical
Physician-Patient Relationships
Health care and its administrative management are becoming increasingly
sophisticated. At the same time, the ability of patients to understand the
complex and often conflicting factors and relationships that influence the
choice of care has failed to keep pace.' ° Quite simply, most patients often
do not understand either the managed-care arrangements or the contractual
implications that govern the patient's relationships with managed-care
2
employees.1 '
Even the underlying assumptions that formerly governed the
physician-patient relationship no longer hold in the new managed-care
world." The ongoing, long-term relationships between physician and
patient that were once the hallmark of medical service are no longer the
norm. The traditional physician-patient relationship has lost its intimacy
as employer-sponsored insurance plans switch people into managed-care
settings where a patient's choice of physician is often lI-mited to an

118

Md.

119

d"
"H

1

ERT E. KLARmAN, THE EcoNommcs oFHEALTH, 14 (1965).
'Mechanic, supranote 75, at 219.
l Hall, supra note 75, at 704 n.32. The author cites numerous sources which oppose
making physicians function as rationers of health-care resources-for any reason. Chief among
these sources are the American Medical Association's position that "the treating physician must
remain a patient advocate and therefore should not make allocation decisions." Id.
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approved list of providers.23 Patients in managed-care settings also
complain of an inability to see the same physician over their course of care.
As a consequence of these two factors, the historic physician-patient
relationship is not as strong or supportive of patients' needs as it once may
have been.
Among the implications of this deterioration in physician-patient
relations is that the physician is no longer unequivocally seen as the
patient's advocate in always pursuing what is medically best for the
patient.' Some consumer advocates are concerned that by definition, the
capitation arrangements of managed-care providers set up a conflict
between the competing interests of physicians and patients." There is a
perception among some physicians that because of the fixed-income
characteristics of the managed-care arrangement, when a patient walks
through the door, he or she is a liability, not an asset.12
Of even greater concern is the fact the economic considerations
responsible for the financial success of managed-care organizations can
poison the very core of the physician-patient relationship.'27 The level of

trust between the two parties is corrupted when physicians are required to
incorporate economic factors into their medical advice."

Simple

adithmetic demonstrates that when considering which treatment to provide
in managed-care delivery, with a limit on the capitated income available
reUnited States v. MercyHealth Serv., 902 F. Supp. 96S, 973 (N.D. Ia. 1995) (noting that
managed-care plan members may have the choice of visiting only the approved list of pr.iders
for minimal prices, or seeing any provider of their choosing if they pay higher price-).
n1VictorR. Fuchs, The "Rationing" of Medical Care,311 NEw EN;o. J. Mm. 1572, 1573
(1984). Victor Fuchs, a noted economist and ardent supporter of health-care rationing, has
warned that "the commitment of the individual physician to the individual patient is one of the
most valuable features of American medical care...."-one that should not be disturbed. Id.
r2sLarson, supranote 77, at 47.
1
26Id.

lJerome Kassirer, ManagedCareand thw Morality of t1w Markzaplace,333 NEW ErgG.
J. MED. 50-51 (1995).

" James T.C. Li, M.D., PILD., Thw Patient Physician Relationship: Covenant or
Contract?,71 MAYO CU.M. PRo., 917,918 (1996). The author places significant respansibility
for the decline in physician-patient relations on the physicians. Dr. Li notes that physicians
should be faulted for submitting to the external pressures of managed care and for betraying the
trust granted to them by their patients. He further notes parallels vith physician acquiezce to the
allures and demands of medicine under Nazi Germany when physicians also failed to put the
needs of their patients above other, non-medical considerations. Id.
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from each patient, the cost of a particular treatment must be weighed
against less expensive alternatives. This situation was candidly noted in the
New England Journal of Medicine:
On the one hand,physicians are expected to provide a wide range of
services, recommend the best treatments and improve patients'
quality of life. On the other hand, to keep expenses to a minimum,
they must limit the use of services, increase efficiency, shorten the
time spent with each patient and use specialists sparingly; ...
increasingly the struggle will be more concrete and stark;
[P]hysicians will be forced to choose between the best interests of
their patients and their own economic survival. '
This explicit weighing of economic factors is an integral part of the
contractual arrangement between the managed-care group and the
physician."' Providers are handcuffed in their ability to resist the
managed-care group's determininations of which treatments will be
reimbursed because providers who resist will either end up paying some
expenses themselves or be frozen out of further participation in the
managed-care network.'
This cost-reducing requirement is so critical to the managed-care
approach that HMO's in New Jersey, for example, are actively opposing
proposed legislation that would require them to disclose to consumers any
financial incentives offered to physicians to hold down medical costs. 3 '

Emergence Of Clinical Outcome
Measurements
Efforts to identify and quantify measures of quality of care, which have
languished for decades due to a lack of compelling need, are now actively
pursued by the managed-care industry and others under the label of
"outcomes measurement."' 33 Initially, the belief was that managed-care
' Kassirer, supranote 127, at 50.

'Larson, supra note 77, at 47.
31

Anders, supra note 35, at 142.

..2Matthew P. Schwartz, New Jersey ProposesA Slew of New Regulationsfor HMO's,
NATIONAL UNDERwm
R Lim &H.ALTH-FiNANCAL SERVICES EDrrON, Nov. 27, 1995, at 1.
"3Anders, supranote 35, at 4042.
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groups would disseminate information on clinical outcomes, thereby
enabling patients to make smarter choices concerning health care.M But
the reality turned out to be little more than marketing programs for the
managed-care groups.'35 The outcomes measured by managed-care firms
were dominated by figures on how well managed care did at checking
cholesterol and doing routine cancer screenings, everything except tracking
their success in delivering effective care to seriously ill people." 6
Perhaps it is no accident that such efforts are being undertaken in
earnest at this time. Managed-care groups now need such standardized
data in order to compile statistics that will help them determine cost
effectiveness of various clinical protocols. A focus on outcomes data alone
may also serve to deflect public attention from the economic incentives
offered to medical personnel for decreasing the use of specific, expensive
procedures." This occurs when physicians give advice to patients about
different possible paths of treatment. A spokesperson for the New Jersey
HMO Association hinted at this deflection policy when he declared
"outcomes data in terms of somebody being ill is more important than
providing information on how physicians are compensated."'3 3 But is this
necessarily true from the consumer perspective? Is outcome data alone all
that is needed for consumers to make informed choices regarding medical
treatment? Should economic information be ignored because there is no
role for it to play?
Impacts Of Managed-Care Economics On Physician
Choices For Patient Care Do Not
Always Favor The Patient
As physicians become more attuned to factoring economic considerations
into their clinical protocols, they may be unaware of the degree to which
such financial considerations influence their decisions.' In the managed-

tol'd.
at 237.

'Id. at 41.

L"Id.

'Wendy K. Mariner, Outcomes Assessment in Health Care Reform: Promise and
Limitations,20 Abs. J. L.&Mm. 37,47-48 (1994).
LShwartz, supranote 132, at 2.
'Applebaum, supranote 75, at 674.
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care environment, medical necessity may become vulnerable to
reinterpretation on the basis of the economic pressures under which
managed-care operates. 14' Three aspects of these issues must be noted:
patients cannot exercise true autonomy of treatment choice; recent
examples reveal how physicians often influence patients' medical choices;
and physicians may no longer function as effective patient advocates.
Patients Cannot Exercise Autonomy
In Choosing Treatments
This situation obviously presents problems for patients as well. From a
simple, informed consent point of view, considerable doubt is raised as to
whether patients will understand the impact of such economic
considerations on their treatment.141 If the practice guidelines established
by managed-care organizations are not known or fully comprehended by
patients, the economic influence exerted on physicians to modify medical
choices will similarly go undetected by the patient. 142 This is a critical
point because patients most often defer to the medical judgment of their
physicians.' 43

Although the patient may mechanically give final approval to perform
a procedure, in reality, it is the physician who structures the decision
through the selection of options presented to the patient and in the manner
in which such options are described.'" The patient has no independent
means of verifying either the range of medical possibilities or the
desirability of undergoing any given procedure. 45 It is solely through the
gatekeeper of medical knowledge, the physician, that the patient comes in
contact with the decision regarding what should be done. If the economic
pressures under which that information is provided are not clearly known

'40d.
at 671.
141
1d. at 672.
142Id.
14 3

HERMON M. SoMRs & ANNE R. SOMES, DocToRs, PATIENTS, AND H3ALTH
INsURrANcE, 468-69 (1961).

4Klannan, supra note 120, at 15.
Mechanic, supra note 75, at 219.
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by the patient, then it is questionable whether informed consent or a
personal autonomy interest can be freely exercisedY"6
Examples Reveal How Physicians
Often Influence Patients'
Medical Choices
A recent example of how physicians often influence patients' medical
choices is found in the area of obstetrics. In the 1960's and continuing
through the early 1980's, alternative birthing approaches were used with
increasing frequency.'47 The impetus for natural birthing and related
alternatives largely came from the mothers." 4 However, since that time a
dramatic pullback occurred in approaches to birthing. 49 This change came
about through the exertion of physician rather than patient preferences."'
As hospitals hired more physicians who specialized in anesthetizing women
against labor pain, more women began to seek out this service.' A similar
decision-influencing process may be at work in other medical decisions.
Perhaps an even more dramatic example of managed-care economics
seeking to channel medical decisions into financially advantageous paths
is a case involving an HMO's initial refusal to allow a patient facing a lifethreatening breast cancer to have needed transplants. 5 While waiting to
see the H{MO's medical director about the matter, the patient accidently
overheard him on the phone, angrily denouncing the fact her attending
physician had informed her about the expensive transplant program at
another, non-IHMO hospital..
Another cancer patient required an
expensive bone marrow transplant in order to live.'" Later, when she
eventually saw an HMO specialist on the matter, she left from the

46Id. at 220.
147Cindy Schreuder, UnderbwaterBirthsArise As A Mainstream Option, CiniGo. TPJB., Oct.

18, 1996, § 1, at 30.
149Id.

mId.
5
7id.
"Larson, supranote 77, at 47.
IsId.
MId.
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encounter distrusting the advice she had been given. 155 Her family noted
the physician declined to even describe what was involved in a bone
marrow transplant or to give the family a tour of the medical facility where
it could be performeA 156 Her husband was convinced the physician "was
told to send us away, making it as discouraging as possible."'157
Physicians May No Longer Function
As Effective Advocates For
Their Patients
The fact that patients largely follow the lead of medical professionals and
agree to whatever treatment is recommended brings the discussion
squarely back to the conflict between physicians and patients that resulted
from the managed-care structure. The issue of patient trust in physician
recommendations takes on new importance when physicians are employees
who are contractually obligated to implement the treatment priorities
established by their managed-care employers.' 58 In their new roles as
employees, physicians are no longer in a position to always act as effective
advocates for the patients' needs. 5 9 Were physicians to routinely conceal

medical treatment options from which patients may benefit because such
options did not conform to the economic preferences of their managedcare employers, then the very core of the physician-patient relationship
would be jeopardized."
These same concerns become more pronounced in the context of a
rapidly growing managed-care environment. Non-managed care options
are increasingly disappearing from the choice of insured medical plans

155 d.
1
5Id.
"5Larson,supranote 77, at 47.

'Safeguarding the Health Care of Senior Citizens, 1996: HearingsBefore the Subcomm.
on Labor, Health and Human Services and Education,of the Senate Comm. on Appropriation,
104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (statement of John C. Nelson, M.D. for the Am. Med. Assoc.). See

Li, supra note 130, at 917-18 (discussing the role that physicians have played in enabling the
physician-patient relationship to deteriorate).
11U,
supranote 130, at 917-18.
60
Applebaum, supranote 75, at 675.
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provided by employers.16 ' In some states, even Medicaid recipients are
being moved into the managed-care structure 2
Managed-care organizations, physicians, and patients are not, as some
may assume, the only players. There remains a significant role to be filled
by the state in pursuing its interests to promote the health and welfare of
its citizens.
The State Possesses Clear Interests In
Physician-Assisted Suicide
The extensive economic influences exerted by managed care discussed
earlier are not the only forces affecting the assisted suicide question. The
state has a significant countervailing role to play. It does so primarily in
three ways: in its capacity as regulator of professionals who can exert
undue economic influence with respect to vulnerable population segments;
in its capacity of protecting consumer interests; and in its traditional role
of preventing suicide and preserving life.
The State Has An Interest In Regulating Professionals
Who Can Exert Undue Economic Influence
On Vulnerable Populations
States have an unequivocal interest in the regulation of medical
professionals to ensure the interests of the lay public are protected in
situations where the public is vulnerable. 63 When other professions have
demonstrated similar problems with conflicts of interest between the
financial interests of professionals and the people they serve, the states
have not hesitated to intervene and assert their role of furthering the
welfare of the public.
For example, in Ohralik v. Ohio State BarAss'n, the United States
Supreme Court held the potential for "undue influence, intimidation,

"Id.
at 673. Options for health insurance are dwindling as current plans merge and many
employers offer their workers only a single choice plan. Id. This trend is further suppored by
the fact that approximately seventy-five percent of the non-entitlement, insured patient population
is covered under some form of managed care. See United States v. Mercy Health Serv., 902 F.

Supp. 968, 973 (N.D. Ia. 1995).
"Schwartz, supranote 132, at 2.

11Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447,467 (1978).
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overreaching, and other forms of'vexatious conduct' was so .likely to occur
when lawyers solicited clients in person, that such solicitation could be
constitutionally prohibited by the state. '""M Ohralik was a lawyer who
approached two young accident victims, one while she lay in traction in the
hospital, in order to pursue their legal interests in the accident. 65 He tried
to unduly influence them by stressing the contingency-fee arrangement,
thereby making his offer appear to be without cost and irresistible. 1" The
court explained that in vulnerable situations a distressed or unsophisticated
lay person,
simply in response to persuasion
"may place his trust in a lawyer ...
under circumstances conducive to uninformed acquiescence ...
makes him more vulnerable to
[Tihe very plight of that person ...
influence ...
[U]nder such circumstances, it is not unreasonable for
the State to presume that in-person solicitation by lawyers more
often than not will be injurious to the person solicited." 167
The Court made it clear a preventative rule like that in Ohralik was
justified only in situations which were "inherently conducive to
overreaching and other forms of misconduct."'" Because of a person's
"susceptibility and vulnerability, that individual becomes positioned such
that it is likely he or she will place unwarranted trust in a professional,
possessing superior knowledge, and motivated by pecuniary
' Such undue influence was also determined to exist in
considerations."169
NationalFuneralServices, Inc. v. Rockefeller. 70° In that case a funeral
home salesperson intrusively solicited a family member for funeral services
when the person was emotionally vulnerable. 7

164

d. at 462, 470.

65

1 1d. at 450-52.
1661d.
1671d. at 465-466.
16Ohralik,436 U.S. at 464.
1996).
'6 Desnick v. The Dep't of Professional Regulation, 665 N.E.2d 1346, 1358 (Ill.

'National Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Rockefeller, 870 F.2d 136 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 966 (1989).
1711d.

1997]

UNDUE ECONOMIC INFLUENCE

571

The context in which physician-assisted suicide occurs is similar to
both Ohralik and NationalFuneral Services. Like the lawyer's undue
influence on the accident victim in Ohralik,in physician-assisted suicide the
undue economic influence exerted by the physician on behalf of the
managed-care group comes at a time when the terminally-ill patient is in a
stressful, vulnerable state, both physically and mentally. Similar to the
lawyer's irresistible financial offer, the managed-care promise of a quick,
pain-free death, one that spares loved ones additional financial burdens,
could appear "irresistible" to a person in need of pain management and
emotional support. Also, like the accident victim in Ohralik, terminally-ill
patients are prone to "uninformed acquiescence" with the wishes of the
person attempting to unduly influence them for that person's own
economic gain. Also, similar to the cases noted above, at such critical
times, the state has a substantial interest in protecting the individual from
being unduly influenced. As one court phrased it, "because the public is
susceptible to advertising or promises of medical relief, there exists a
potential for abuse which the State has a compelling interest to guard
72
against.'
By contrast, the medical setting of physician-assisted suicide is
decidedly unlike that of the Certified Public Accountant (CPA) in
Edenfield v. Fane.173 In Fane, the United States Supreme Court ruled
against the Florida Board of Accountancy, which asserted interests in
protecting consumers from fraud by CPAs.7 4 Fane is distinguishable from
the earlier state-interest cases and from physician-assisted suicide because
the typical CPA client is less susceptible to manipulation than the innocent
young accident victim in Ohralik or the vulnerable, terminally-ill patient
who has been introduced to the idea of pursuing physician-assisted suicide.
Prospective CPA clients have existing, ongoing relations with
accountants and, therefore, possess an independent basis for evaluating
what the CPA might say to influence the client." 5 The CPA's offer is
made for a long-term engagement, something decidedly different from a
terminally-ill patient's prognosis. The CPA also looks for referrals and
'72Desnck, 665 N.E.2d at 1355.
'"Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
'74 d.
'75 d. at 775.
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repeat business. 176 These relational aspects are, of course, missing from
the accident victim's interaction with the lawyer, as well as from the
terminally-ill patient's relationship with the physician.
In summary, the characteristics of medical professionals in potentially
exerting undue influence on the terminally-ill patient are highly comparable
to those in other professions such as law and funeral services and their
interaction with vulnerable clients. The mere fact some professions, such
as public accounting, do not share these characteristics is no reason to treat
all professionals alike and exempt them from continuing state scrutiny
regarding how they influence their clients.
The Supreme Court reinforced this proposition when it proclaimed:
"Wehave given consistent recognition to the State's important interests in
'
maintaining standards of ethical conduct in the licensed professions."177
Thus, the State has a decided interest in how licensed medicl professionals
influence the choices made by terminally-ill patients. This is particularly
true when the competing interests being balanced are those of a
consumer's life or death versus a medical provider's economic benefit.
The State Has Additional Interests In Guarding
Patients' Rights Through Its Consumer
Protection Capacity
In addition to the state interest in licensed medical professionals' conduct
as agents of managed-care groups, other related state interests also play
into the physician-assisted suicide context. States have an ongoing interest
in protecting their citizens from undue economic influence when citizens
act as consumers.' 7 Here, the consumer is a purchaser of a particular
medical service -- assisted suicide. Given that the nature of advice sought
is largely unknowable to the consumer, yet can potentially exert a
176

1d. at 776.

17

Id. at 770. The Court proceeded on to list the most prominent of those cases: Ohralik
v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 460; Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens

Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 766 (1976); National Society of Professional Engineers
v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978).
'SZauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626

(1985) (noting, in part, the state's interest in preventing deception of consumers); Bates v. State
Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 366 (1977) (describing a state's right to restrict practices that have

the potential to exert undue influence over consumers).
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significant impact on the buyer, a state has a responsibility to ensure the
interests of the individual are appropriately safeguarded.
The State Also Possesses Traditional Interests
Related To Preventing Suicide and
Preserving Life
The state also possesses other more traditional interests which were the
only ones explicitly acknowledged by the courts in Compassionin Dying.
However, as previously noted, the various courts in that case could not
agree on the scope of the traditional state interests. They include
preventing suicide, preventing undue influence and abuse, preserving life,
protecting the integrity of the medical profession, not subjecting the elderly
or infirm to psychological pressure to consent to their own deaths,
protecting all handicapped persons from societal indifference and apathy,
avoiding the involvenent of third parties, and preventing abuse similar to
what has occurred in the Netherlands.' The situation in the Netherlands
may have a direct bearing on potential methods of administering physicianassisted suicide and will be discussed separately below.
Given the undeniably significant state interests in preventing undue
economic influence on physician-assisted suicide, it is imperative all these
interests be explicitly included in court decisions weighing personal
autonomy interests against the state interests. Yet, to date, neither of the
two decisions recognizing a right to physician-assisted suicide ever
mentioned key words such as "economic" or "financiar' when considering
the state interests.S

Lessons Concerning the Ineffectiveness of
Attempting to Control Physicians' Death-Related
Activities can be Learned From The Netherlands
In Compassionin Dying, the Ninth Circuit briefly noted any pressures on
patients' physician-assisted suicide decisions could be eliminated by
7CorMpassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994), 49 F.3d
586 (9th Cir. 1995), 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en bane).
'Campassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en bane), and Quill
v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996). See supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing how
the word "financial" is used in the en bane court's opinion).
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establishing rules to ensure free choices are made."' Yet, the issue cannot
be dismissed as easily as this comment might imply. The Netherlands
experience with euthanasia is instructive regarding the reality of leaving the
problem to be handled by a list of rules.
As in the United States, cost containment is being pursued as one of
the primary goals of Dutch health-care policy."s Legal support for
euthanasia has developed within this environment, yet contrary to popular
belief, the Netherlands has not legalized euthanasia.' 83 In fact, Dutch penal
codes 293
and 294 make both euthanasia and any type of assisted suicide
T 4
illegal.
Euthanasia differs from physician-assisted suicide because the act of
employing some vehicle to impart death is performed by the physician
rather than the patient.'85 In physician-assisted suicide, the physician
simply provides the vehicle of death (drugs, instructions, or mechanical
devices) to the patient. 86 The patient is then responsible for using the
vehicle to commit his or her own suicide. Euthanasia constitutes a more
direct intervention by someone other than the patients themselves. The
ways in which legal controls work to control the practice of euthanasia
provide a critical perspective and warning for those who casually assume
a list of rules will easily resolve any misgivings over the granting of the
comparatively lesser right to commit assisted suicide.
Although euthanasia is technically illegal in the Netherlands," s it is
relatively easy for physicians to "administer death" to a patient while

'Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1465 (W.D. 1994).
2RestructuringHealth Care, LANCET, Jan. 28, 1989, at 209. The Netherlands is not
unique in this respect Many European countries which provide universal access to basic healthcare treatment thruugh a mixture of mandated and voluntary health insurance ere experimenting
with new ways to increase the level of competition in the medical marketplace. Annas & Miller,
supra note 31, at 380.
"'Giles R. Scofield, J.D., Exposing Some Myths About Physician-AssistedSuicide, 18
SEATrLE U.L REV. 473,493 (1995).
184EuthanasiaPracticein Holland, Fact Sheet, International Anti-Euthanasia Task Force,
March, 1994, availablein LifeWEB: Euthanasia Roundtable.
185
Peter M. Megough, M.D., Medical Concerns About Physician-AssistedSuicide, 18
1

SEATT=E U.L. REV. 521,521 (1995).
1

6Id.

'Scofield, supranote 183, at 493.

1997]

UNDUE ECONOMIC INFLUENCE

avoiding legal penalties."a

575

This is achieved by complying with a list of

guidelines established by the Rotterdam Court." 9 If these guidelines are
followed, no criminal action is taken against the physician."
The problem with this arrangement is that it is freely ignored. A study
conducted by the attorney general of the High Council of the Netherlands
documented that although involuntary euthanasia is quite prevalent in

Holland, the guidelines are, in fact, openly violated."' The study reviewed
the particulars behind 2,300 deaths by voluntary euthanasia and 400 cases
of physician-assisted suicide in 1990." z People were troubled when the
finding revealed that in 1,000 cases, the patients life was ended by
euthanasia without an explicit request. 93 Additionally, 8,000 patients died

lnMichael Gray, Gently into the Night, ThENEw PHYSIcmA, Jan-Feb., 1990, at 19.
1Id. at 21 (listing, in part, the guidelines which physicians must follow in order to escape
prosecution for murder). See Marlise Simons, Dutch ParliamentApproves Lop Permitting
Euthanasia,N.Y. TwMs, Feb. 10, 1993, at A1O L (providing further information regarding these
guidelines). The guidelines state that only physicians are permitted to perform euthanasia, and
only ifi
(1) The patient is suffering unbearably in an irreversible situation.
(2) The patient is a sane and rational adult who has thoughtfully and persistently made
the request.
(3) The request for euthanasia must be entirely of the patients own free will and not
under pressure from others.
(4) The patient must be well informed and must be able to consider the alternatives.
(5) The patient must have a "lasting longing for death."
(6) The physician must consult at least one colleague who has faced the question of
euthanasia before.
Id.
19Id.
'Riternational Anti-Euthanasia Task Force, supranote 184. The finding3 are contained
in the 1991 Remmelink Report. The official name of this study is: MedicalDceisionsAbout t1W
End of Life, I. Report of the Committee to Study theMedicalPracticeConcerningEuthanasia,
II. The Study for the Committee on Medical PracticeConcerningEuthanasia(2 vols.), THE
HAGUEI_, Sept. 19, 1991.
"Simons, supranote 189, at A10 L
'Id. Of this number, 14 percent were fully competent patients; seventy-two percent had
never given any indication that they would want to end their lives; and in eight percent of the
cases, the physicians performed involuntary euthanasia "despite the fact that they believed
alternative options were still possible." International Anti-Euthanasia Task Force, supra note
186.
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because physicians deliberately provided overdoses of pain mdication--not
to control pain, but to hasten their deaths.'9
The bottom line is that most euthanasia cases in the Netherlands are
involuntary deaths. 95 This grim fact is concealed by the practice among
physicians of falsifying death certificates, claiming death iresulted from
"natural causes."' As one observer noted, "[i]f the family physician does
not report a case of voluntary euthanasia or an assisted suicide, there is
nothing to control."197
This is the true condition of euthanasia in the Netherlands. It provides
the clear warning that establishing a list of guidelines, however well
intended, cannot be relied upon to adequately control the use of physicianassisted suicide in this country."9 It remains for the courts and legislatures
to develop integrated solutions to address the multi-faceted, :related issues
that combine under the label of physician-assisted suicide.
INCLUSION AND INTEGRATION OF
ECONOMIC FACTORS IS IMPERATIVE
The debate over physician-assisted suicide has been notable not only for
the deep moral and constitutional concerns involved, but also for the lack
of recognition of the growing economic component of managed care. This

unfortunate situation is further compounded by the fact that there is no
integration of the key personal autonomy, social, moral/ethical, political,
legal, and economic considerations.

1

"fInternational Anti-Euthanasia Task Force, supra note 184.
Id. (noting survey results showing that in forty-five percent of the cases, the families of

19

hospitalized patients who underwent involuntary euthanasia did not know that their relatives
were purposely killed).
196Id.
197Marlise Simons, DutchMove to EnactLawMaldng EuthanasiaEasier,N.Y. TIMES, Feb.

9, 1993, § 1, at Al.
"ftis interesting to note that a "Death With Dignity" initiative in the state of Washington
(Initiative 119) was defeated due to a similar feeling of mistrust of the medical community.
Observers believe that the initiative was defeated because "ultimately the fear of a painful and
degrading death was overcome by fear of killing by unaccountable physicians ... ." George J.
Annas, J.D., M.P.H.,DeathBy Prescription:The Oregon Initiative, 331 NLw EN,). 3. MED. 1240

(1994).
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Given this inconsistent and incomplete history, the physician-assisted
suicide question requires careful delineation of and agreement on the
identification and scope of the key factors. Such inclusion must take into
account the state's compelling interest in protecting the autonomy of
patients/consumers when confronted by the powerful economically driven
goals of a managed-care environment. Then, once all the critical
components of the issue are properly identified, they must be integrated if
a true balancing of the rights of all parties is to be achieved.
Critical social decisions regarding the proper levels and distribution
of health-care dollars will be demanded with accelerating frequency in a
health-care world dominated by managed-care perspectives. Indeed, that
is the raisond'etre of current trends in health-care financing and delivery.
Some form of rationing seems inevitable as demands for medical treatment
increase both in quantity as the population grows, and in intensity of use
as the elderly segment of the population creates an increased demand for
limited medical resources. These decisions can best be made if the
discussions leading up to them are informed by the inclusion of all relevant
factors, especially the neglected economic factors which drive the healthcare marketplace.
The legal community has much to contribute to this social discussion,
but can effectively do so only if it integrates the various contending
concepts. Those concepts include the legal implications of growing
economic arrangements which, thus far, have only been applied in isolation
from one another. To date, court opinions have neglected to take
advantage of the clear and pressing opportunities to do so.
The Supreme Court's decisions in Compassion in Dying and Quill
have merely transferred the debate over assisted-suicide back to the
individual states, with the likely result of a continuing debate unlikely to be
resolved satisfactorily. By allowing the issue of a state's compelling
interest in the economic drivers that directly influence assisted-suicide to
remain largely unarticulated, the Supreme Court renders impossible the
very type of informed public debate it hopes to achieve by declining to take
a stand on the issue. Although the Court's intentions in sending the issue
back to the states are laudable, its approach is flawed. The inevitable
legacy of the Court's failure to openly address the states' compelling
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interests in the emerging managed-care economics that underpin this issue
is unfortunate.
The realities of the underlying economic forces of managed care can
only be ignored at the peril of all who would argue for, let alone take
advantage of,physician-assisted suicide. Failure to integrate managed-care
economics into the legal discussions on assisted suicide would be to deny
the very personal autonomy rights which many seek to secure for patients.
The reason for this is the very autonomy sought to be exercised cannot be
invoked if it is only allowed to be considered in a medical environment
where the primary source of assisted suicide advice comes from physicians
with economic interests that could objectively be at variance with those of
the patient.
Ignoring the financial underpinnings of the act of assisting suicide only
serves the limited interests of managed-care organizations themselves.
These organizations are the only true winners if physician-assisted suicide
discussions proceed, as they are currently, in a disconnected fashion. For
those who choose to hear them, warning bells are indeed ringing.
Currently, however, those bells sound increasingly like managed-care cash
registers in the absence of integrated discussions within the legal
profession, the legislature, and society itself.

